Sub-Saharan Migration to Europe in Times of Restriction: An Empirical Test of Substitution Effects.

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Abstract: Studies on the effects of migration policies are usually hampered by a lack of data related both to migration policies and to migration itself. We analyze trends in policies and migration focusing on flows between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe since the mid-1970s. Using the data of both the DEMIG and MAFE project, we compare flows and policies of 3 African and 6 destination countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Senegal on one hand; and Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other hand). Testing the ‘substitution effects’ of restrictive migration policies, we show that they do not result in less out-migration, but rather end up with more irregular migration and less returns. It does not mean that migration policies completely fail, but suggests that other determinants are at play, such as social networks, work opportunities in destination areas or economic and political context at origin.

1. Introduction

The Mediterranean crisis in April 2015, with the drowning of several hundreds of migrants who attempted to reach Italy, attracted international attention. This event, unique in its scale, is not exceptional by nature. Since the late 1980s, images of boats bringing would-be migrants have drawn attention to African migration to Europe (Carling 2007). The generous media coverage of this topic contributes to fuel the idea that there would be an “African invasion” in Europe, even though numbers show that Sub-Saharan migrants are a minority in immigration flows and migrants stocks in Europe (de Haas 2008; Lessault and Beauchemin 2009). Tragic events at the southern border of Europe illustrate simultaneously the will of European countries to restrict entries into EU, and also their inability to do it. Although border controls attract growing funds to reinforce the so-called “Fortress Europe”, migrants continue to attempt crossing the sea, challenging the policy expectation that more controls in immigration can lead to less migration. The effectiveness of migration policies is a much debated question in academic circles (Czaika and de Haas 2013). But studies on the impact of migration policies are still largely hampered
by the lack of data regarding both international migration itself and migration policies. On the one hand, international databases aimed at building quantitative indices measuring the restrictiveness of migration policies have developed only in the last decade (Bjerre et al. 2014), so that policy analyses until recently were based on qualitative accounts rather than on systematic quantitative comparison. On the other hand, conventional international migration data are known to suffer from a large number of limitations (Santo Tomas et al. 2009). Data to study trends of migration in Africa and from African countries are crucially lacking. Census data allow estimating bilateral stocks of migrants for many countries¹, but they give no direct information on migration flows. Administrative statistics on immigration flows are mainly limited to developed countries, and suffer from various imperfections (Poulain et al. 2006). Statistics on outmigration flows are even less frequent, and are also seriously deficient (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008). Although migrants are believed to follow more and more complex trajectories, data on migration routes are essentially based on qualitative studies focusing on irregular migration, ignoring the trajectories of legal migrants. As for quantitative data, the bulk of them is silent regarding migrants’ legal status and the inclusion of undocumented migrants in their sample.

Since the mid-1980s, thanks to various surveys carried out by academics rather than public authorities, Mexican migration has appeared as a major case study for socio-demographers interested in the impact of border control (Cornelius 2001; Massey and Pren 2012). They have shown, for instance, that more restrictive policies in the U.S. did not result in less departure, but in less return; and that increasing border control changed the amount and conditions of irregular migration, raising the number of border crossing attempts despite raising economic and human costs (Cornelius 2001; Massey et al. 2002). To conceptualize under one heading these various types of unintended effects, de Haas (2011) proposed the notion of “substitution effects”, that would explain why restrictive policies do not succeed completely in curbing migration. At least four substitution effects could be at play.

First, “spatial substitution” refers to the changing geography of migration with the hypothesis that migrants reorient their routes and final destination in response to changing differentials in states migration openness in terms both of border control and integration policies. Second, “categorical substitution” refers to the changing legal channels of entry of migrants as a response to states adjustments in legal modalities of entry. This is typically exemplified by the contemporary history of immigration in Western Europe: the end of labour recruitment in the mid-1970 in France and Germany did not end-up with less immigration, but with a reorientation from labour migration permits to family migration permits through reunification (and in a lesser extent to study visas and asylum claims). Another typical example of “categorical substitution” is when irregular migration rises in contexts where possibilities for legal migration shrink, as it may happen for instance when restrictions in asylum policies deflect asylum seekers in irregularity. Third, “inter-temporal substitution” occurs when policy changes encourage migrants to adapt their timing of departure. The hypothesis is that, in periods of tightening policies, potential movers anticipate their migration in the expectation of even more restrictive policies. This “now-or-never” effect could even possibly lead to a growth in migration. Fourth and finally, “reverse flow substitution” happens when immigration restrictions reduce return

migration. Migrants at destination would postpone or cancel their return project because of the uncertainty of return outcomes. If they fail in their reintegration project, bordure closure prevents them from moving again which makes return a too risky option. All these substitution effects result from the migrants’ ability to adapt to changing rules in migration management policies.

In this paper, our objective is to test these substitution effects by providing new evidence on the simultaneous changes in policies and migration trends in the specific context of African migration to Europe. By focusing on Sub-Saharan migration, we contribute to enlarge the understanding of international migration in an academic context widely dominated by the American hemisphere, even though international migration is a very significant phenomenon in Europe (Czaika and de Haas 2014). Without carrying out a systematic comparison between the two migration axes, Mexico-USA and Africa-Europe, this paper however allows to examine to what extent migrants responses to policy changes converge on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, by moving the geographical focus from the Mexico-US corridor to the Africa-Europe migration system, we enlarge the perspective from a one origin / one destination viewpoint to a multi-sited approach that enables us to take into account the effects of various contexts, both in sending and receiving ends, on migrants’ adaptations to policy restrictions. Our analyses are based on three case studies: Congolese, Ghanaian and Senegalese migration. For each origin, two to three destination countries are considered in Europe: on the one hand, the historical receiving country which corresponds systematically to the former colonial power (Belgium for DR Congo, the UK for Ghana, France for Senegal); and, on the other hand, one or two new destinations with features distinct from the historical destinations, especially in matter of integration regimes and socio-cultural conditions, such as language and educational system (the UK for DR Congo, the Netherlands for Ghana, Italy and Spain for Senegal).

The data used in this paper come from two projects. The DEMIG project provides systematic data on visa requirements and migration policies in the six European countries of interest in this paper. And the MAFE project provides information on migration behaviours through micro-data collected both in origin and destination countries, at the household and individual levels. In this paper, we take advantage of the retrospective nature of the data of both projects to describe trends in policies and trends in migration. The analyses carried out are descriptive. They do not allow to assess strictly the effects of policy changes on migration. They rather allow us to examine the congruency between policy and migration changes in a first attempt to study quantitatively migrants’ responses to growing immigration restrictiveness in “Fortress Europe”.

2 In this paper, we refer to the Democratic Republic of Congo, ex-Zaire, also commonly called “Congo-Kinshasa” (to be distinguished from its northern neighbour the Republic of Congo, i.e. Congo-Brazzaville).

3 The DEMIG (Determinant of international migration) project actually covers 45 countries. For more details, see: http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/projects/demig. It was realised thanks to the funding received from the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC through a grant (Grant Agreement 240940) awarded to Hein de Haas. The authors are grateful to Hein de Haas for his generosity in giving access to the DEMIG data.

4 All MAFE (Migration between Africa and Europe) data are available free of charge. For more details, see: http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/. The MAFE project is coordinated by INED (C. Beauchemin) and its other participants are the Université catholique de Louvain (B. Schoumaker), Maastricht University (V. Mazzucato), the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (P. Sakho), the Université de Kinshasa (J. Mangalu), the University of Ghana (P. Quartey), the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (P. Baizan), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (A. Gonzalez-Ferrer), the Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’Immigrazione (E. Castagnone), and the University of Sussex (R. Black). The MAFE project received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement 217206. The MAFE-Senegal survey was conducted with the financial support of INED, the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (France), the Région Ile de France and the FSP programme ‘International Migrations, territorial reorganizations and development of the countries of the South’.
Obviously, (would-be) migrants do not only respond to policy changes. It is already pretty clear in the literature that policies are not the only driver of migration flows. Beyond their historical work on European migration to North America, Hatton and Williamson for instance have well shown the strength of economic and social drivers for contemporary African out-migration (Hatton and Williamson 2003). Migrants’ networks are especially believed to fuel migration and help candidates for migration to fulfil their projects. Massey’s theory of cumulative causation, essentially tested in the case of Mexican migration, suggests that the ability of migrants’ networks to support migration may be higher than the ability of restrictive policies to curb migration (Massey et al. 2002).

Presenting results across three different African flows and six European countries will allow us to speculate about the effects of the social or economic contexts, both at origin and destination, vis-à-vis the effects of migration policy changes. Comparison between old and new destination countries in Europe will especially allow us to discuss the role of policy variations across receiving countries in the evolution of the three African migration systems from a one origin—one destination model (based on colonial history) to a model of multiple destinations. Besides, whereas Sub-Saharan migration is commonly painted as a homogeneous flow (e.g. in Europe, statistics almost never disaggregate African migrants by origin), comparisons between the three origin countries (DR Congo, Ghana and Senegal) will shed some light on the heterogeneity of migration flows between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. Finally, as Europe is not the only destination of African migrants, the paper will also provide some results on other destinations (especially in Africa), allowing for comparisons that will help to better understand the functioning of the Afro-European migration corridor.

Following this introduction, the second section presents a history of migration policies in Europe based on the analysis of the DEMIG database. Its aim is to discuss the notion that European policies have become increasingly restrictive since the 1960s, by taking into account three dimensions: destination country, legal channel of entry and policy area (entry, integration and return). It provides an overview of the contrasting policy opportunities that migrants have/had to adapt to over time and across countries. The third section turns to migration trends and examines migrants’ behaviours. Taking advantage of the retrospective nature of the MAFE data, it provides a unique overview of the evolution of Sub-Saharan migration between 1975 and 2008. It focuses on measures that are usually overshadowed in conventional data. While the literature on international migration generally suffers from an “immigration bias” (Beauchemin 2014; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003), this section provides measures of departure and return and looks both at intended and actual migration. It also brings new evidence on the legal and spatial trajectories of African migrants in Europe. Figures on migration trends are used to discuss the relevance of the four above cited substitution effects. Finally, the fourth section concludes.

2. A short history a migration policies in Europe (1960-2010)

A time of growing restrictions?

The mid-1970s are a turning point in the migration history of Western Europe. After WWII, the European economic growth generated a need for labour in various sectors and Western European countries recruited migrants from Southern Europe and non-European countries to work in mining, construction and steel. In most European countries, the idea was to “import
labour but not people" (Castles 2006), and the conditions of entry were flexible (Donovon 1988). At that time, for instance, France encouraged the free movement of labour migrants originating in its former colonies and set up there recruitment offices. The oil crisis of 1973-74 pushed the European destination countries to abruptly put an end to the recruitment of foreign labour (Castles 2006). This can be exemplified by the volumes of economic migration in France: in 1974, 130 000 workers entered France; in 1975, the number dropped to 30 000, and in 2007 they were only 12 000.

Since the mid-70s, migration has become an increasingly politicized topic in the oldest immigration countries in Europe (e.g. France, Germany, the UK). Policy makers claim that it is increasingly necessary to control the entry and stay of immigrants from non-European countries on their territory (Geddes 2003), and to encourage or force them to return (Cassarino 2008). The image of “fortress Europe” has become pervasive in public discourses and gained a practical dimension with the creation of FRONTEX, the European Border Agency, in 2005. An arsenal and considerable resources were then put in place to try to prevent access to the EU territory to migrants who do not hold a visa (Figure 1, see also: Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011).

Even though the creation of FRONTEX is a strong signal of the European willingness to control borders, migration policies remain essentially defined at the national level (Guiraudon 2000). EU is definitely not a homogeneous territory in terms of migration policies, so that the idea that Europe as a whole became increasingly restrictive since the mid-1970s might be considered as an overstatement. Furthermore, migrants form a heterogeneous group within which some are considered desirable by governments, while others are unwanted; an opposition that was made very clear by the French President Sarkozy when he defined family migrants as a “migration subie” (i.e. both unwanted and harmful for the country) and high-skilled workers a “migration choisie” (i.e. chosen migration). For this reason as well, saying bluntly that migration policies in Europe have become increasingly restrictive since the mid-1970s remains a too general statement. Moreover, the restrictiveness of measures implemented to control

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5 Source: Beauchemin, Borrel et al. (forthcoming) and http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Info-ressources/Documentation/Tableaux-statistiques/L-admission-au-sejour-les-titres-de-sejour
migration may considerably vary according to the policy area. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between policies aimed at (1) controlling the entry of migrants to destination countries; (2) regulating the integration of migrants on their territory; and (3) encouraging or forcing migrants to return. Finally, there might be a considerable gap between tough immigration discourses by politicians and actual migration policies, which may be less restrictive than said. This is what Czaika and de Haas (2014) call the “discursive gap”, referring to the fact that discourses are not necessarily related to concrete policy formulation.

Data sources on migration policies
A strict analysis of the evolution of migration policies requires systematic data allowing to perform cross-country comparisons as well as longitudinal analyses, and to distinguish the measures targeting the different types of migrants in the different policy areas. So far, with a few exceptions, most analyses of migration policies have been qualitative in nature. In line with other recent projects on migration policies (a brief presentation of the existing databases is given in Table A-1, in appendix), the DEMIG project provides quantitative indicators to measure the restrictiveness of migration policies. Its comparative advantage rests in the breadth of its coverage in terms of countries, period and indicators on major changes in migration policies. Two databases are used in this paper. On one hand, the DEMIG VISA database, which is a global panel of bilateral travel visa requirements covering the 1973-2013 period (de Haas and Villares-Varela forthcoming), provides insights on the evolution of visa requirements in Europe.

On the other hand, the DEMIG POLICY database tracks changes in migration policies (de Haas et al. 2014). For this paper, we recoded the information available in the DEMIG POLICY database to select information about migration policy changes in Belgium, UK, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands between 1960 and 2010 targeting the three areas of entry, integration and return for non-European migrants. The DEMIG POLICY database follows a right-based approach consisting in evaluating whether each policy change increases or decreases migrants rights, taking into account variations between migrant statuses (irregular migrants; high-skilled workers; low-skilled workers; asylum seekers, refugees, international students; and family members).

Table A-2, in appendix, illustrates how policy changes were coded. Measures intending to restrict the rights of a migrant group regarding the entry and integration are coded +1 (creating a more restrictive situation than before), while measures intending to increase the rights of a migrant group are coded -1 (creating a less restrictive situation than before). Measures aiming at encouraging or forcing migrants to return are coded +1, while those preventing the return of migrants are coded -1. The indicators allow to evaluate changes in restrictiveness of each new policy measure introduced compared to the existing situation in each country, regarding the same policy area and each category of migrants. This implies some limitations. First, DEMIG

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6 Measures provided here do not take into account bilateral agreements, as we wanted to capture the changes that applied only to all non-European migrants, and not to those have a specific citizenship. Consequently, we did neither not take into consideration the policies targeting European migrants or citizens. Also, our recodification allows a clear distinction between the 3 exclusive areas of policies regulating the entry, the stay (referring to integration) and return. We also unmerged the category of “migrant workers” in the categories of “low-” and “high-skilled workers”, and excluded the specific categories, such as the foreign criminals and the terrorism-suspected immigrants.
POLICY does not provide an assessment of the absolute level of restrictiveness of a specific policy within a country and over time, but it is an ordinal variable assessing the relative change in restrictiveness in a specific policy field. As a result, DEMIG POLICY does not allow a comparison of the levels of restrictiveness of migration policies for each category of migrants between countries. However, it is a good proxy to evaluate the extent of the policy changes implemented over time to control or ease migration for each category of migrants in each country, and to show the timing and rhythm of policy changes. These elements are very useful for the purpose of this paper aiming at studying how migrants respond to policy changes. However, a second limitation of the database is that it assumes that migrants react more to policy changes rather than to the levels of restrictions. Yet, it is unclear whether migrants have more information on their effective rights or on the changes implemented and reducing their rights. Another limitation is related to the implementation gap in migration policies (Czaika and de Haas 2013). The database takes into account the measures “on paper”, but there is often a gap between the policies “on paper” and the effective outcomes, which are still more difficult to measure. Finally, the extent of the change may considerably vary according to the measures, but the database does not inform on the extent of changes.

Trends in entry policies

Today, getting a visa to migrate from Africa to Europe is difficult. Lucas (2014), who studied the applications of individuals for Schengen visas and the refusal rate between 2005 and 2009, shows that applications from Sub-Saharan Africa, relative to population, are half that of non-African Third-Countries for which visas are required (0.4% vs. 0.8%), but that the refusal rate is higher for the former than for the latter (16% vs. 6%). DEMIG VISA gives information in the changes in travel visa requirements and offers a first insight to answer the question whether Europe has become consistently more restrictive over the last decades. Figure 2 clearly indicates a generalisation of border control through visa policies: while 80% of European countries required that African migrants have a visa to enter their territory until the mid-1980s, the proportion rose to 100% in 2010. This European trend, with no equivalent within Africa (Figure 2), reflects national preferences for more control, but it also results from the creation of a free circulation zone within Europe (Schengen area, signed by the EU countries in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997): borders’ opening within the EU was correlated to more control at the external borders of Europe. Practically, this means that African migrants who used to be exempted from visas to specific countries are now systematically required to apply for a visa prior to travelling to Europe. This is for instance the case for Senegalese migrants: for them, entering without a travel visa was the legal norm until 1986 in France and 1990 in Italy. Until these dates, Senegalese migrants could enter without any restriction (i.e. without having to apply for a visa prior to departure) and, in practice, were expected to regularize their administrative situation after finding a job (Vickstrom 2014). In other words, “illegal entry” was then an irrelevant concept.

While Figure 2 suggests growing restrictions in the access of African migrants to Europe, the travel visa restrictiveness is not a perfect tool to measure the restrictiveness of migration policies. It focuses on the entry of people traveling to the destination country for a stay no longer than three months, and does not allow to assess the regulations regarding the access of migrants settling in Europe for longer periods.
Table 1 provides an alternative measure that considers more broadly the various dimensions of entry policies, taking into account the various types of migrants in our 6 countries of interest (for examples regarding the content of the indicator, see Table A-2). On average, it shows that Belgium, UK, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands have increasingly restricted entry of non-European migrants to their territories over time, although to varying degrees for different categories of migrants. Migrant workers (whatever their skills level) were the first to be subject to entry restrictions, when European countries put an end to the recruitment of foreign labour in the aftermath of the oil crisis. Changes in the rights of low-skilled and highly-skilled migrants diverged in the late 1990s, when European countries launched policies to favour immigration of the former ones. For example, many measures aimed at raising the quotas of workers were implemented in Spain between the late 1990s and 2005, in order to provide temporary labour in some sectors such as agriculture, construction and domestic work. Measures allowing the entry of high-skilled migrant workers have also developed, especially since 2009, when an EU Council Directive introduced the Blue Card to allow non-European high-skilled migrants to work in the Schengen member countries (Lucas 2014). For all other migrants, entering Europe has become more difficult especially since the 1990s, be it for family or study reasons, or to request asylum (Gnisci, 2008; Rea, 2007). It is only in the early 1990s that European countries started to implement restrictive measures against irregular migrants. In the 2000s, the “fight against irregular migration” became an explicit objective and a priority field of action at European level (Guiraudon 2000), even though many countries implemented regularizations programmes (Kraler 2009).

Country specific figures also show considerable variations across destinations, confirming that there is no single migration policy in Europe. Unsurprisingly, new destination countries in Southern Europe (Spain and Italy) started lately to adjust their entry policies, as a response to the new flows they were receiving. We won’t provide here a precise typology of countries according to the policy changes they implemented. We will however point some specificities. France and The Netherlands, for instance, represent two cases of very consistent changes towards more restrictions of entry rights of all sorts of migrants. On the contrary, Spain appears as a country that constantly maintained or promoted entry rights of migrants of all categories, but irregular migrants. The UK presents a different profile with a very clear divergence in the rights provided to workers (especially the highly skilled), whose entry possibilities were extended, while other types of migrants steadily experienced restrictions at least since the late 1980s.

**Trends in integration policies**

Policies related to integration vary more greatly per period and migrant category than entry policies. On average, irregular migrants are those who experienced the clearer trends: since the early 1970s and even more since the early 1980s, their rights were constantly infringed (Table 2). On the other hand, all other categories of migrants underwent more changing trends. During a first period, between 1970 and 1990, policies were on average more and more open. But after 1990, and again after the 2000s, policies became more restrictive for asylum seekers, refugees, family migrants, workers and students alike.

Averages actually overshadow great variations in integration policies across receiving countries. France and the UK are countries that adopted the more restrictive stances: from the early 1990s onward, restrictions developed for all migrants whatever their legal status, regular or
not. Italy and Belgium adopted more restrictive policies only for irregular migrants and provided more rights to all other categories of migrants. The timing of these changes differed: the divergence between irregular and regular migrants started as early as in the 1970s in Belgium, and only in the 2000s in Italy where immigration is a newer phenomenon. On the opposite side of the policies spectrum, Spain is a country where migrants’ rights progressed for all migrants since the mid-1980s, including irregular ones. The Netherlands is another country where irregular and regular migrants are not much differentiated.

**Trends in return policies**

Finally, Table 4 reveals that irregular migrants have been the target of return policies since the 1970s. These policies mainly include expulsions as well as the implementation of measures encouraging migrants to return to their origin countries (creation of different types of assisted voluntary return programmes). France was the first country to implement such policies, followed by the other European countries. The return of irregular migrants to their origin country has become a priority in Europe, particularly since 2000 (Cassarino, 2008). The return of asylum seekers has also been encouraged since mid-1980s. However, programmes of assisted return are believed to have little impact on the return of migrants, and there is no clear evidence that reintegration assistance reduces the propensity to re-migrate (Flahaux 2013; Koser and Kuschminder 2015).
FIGURE 2. EVOLUTION OF VISA RESTRICTIVENESS FOR NATIONALS FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES, BY DESTINATION OF COUNTRIES REQUIRING TRAVEL VISAS AND REGIONS OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES (1973-2010)

DESTINATION: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES*

Origin: All African origin countries

Origin: By region of origin in Africa

DESTINATION: AFRICAN COUNTRIES*

Origin: All African origin countries

Origin: By region of origin in Africa

Source: DEMIG VISA database
Computation method: a yearly index is calculated by computing the percentage of African countries that need a travel visa to enter a destination country in Europe. The average value for all destination or origin countries within the region of interest for every year was subsequently calculated.

* List of countries:
Africa: countries from the African continent and Madagascar (not from other islands).
Europe: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Germany Democratic Republic, Germany Federal Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
TABLE 1. MIGRATION POLICY CHANGES REGARDING ENTRY OF NON-EUROPEAN MIGRANTS IN BELGIUM, UK, FRANCE, ITALY, SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1960-2010

Legend:
- Irregular
- High-skilled
- Low-skilled
- Asylum seekers
- Refugees
- Students
- Family members

Note:
Positive values on vertical axis = more restrictive
Negative values on vertical axis = less restrictive

Source:
DEMIG POLICY database recoded by the authors
TABLE 2. MIGRATION POLICY CHANGES REGARDING INTEGRATION OF NON-EUROPEAN MIGRANTS IN BELGIUM, UK, FRANCE, ITALY, SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1960-2010

Legend:
- Irregular
- High-skilled
- Low-skilled
- Asylum seekers
- Refugees
- Students
- Family members

Note:
Positive values on vertical axis = more restrictive
Negative values on vertical axis = less restrictive

Source:
DEMIG POLICY database recoded by the authors
TABLE 3. MIGRATION POLICY CHANGES REGARDING RETURN OF NON-EUROPEAN MIGRANTS IN BELGIUM, UK, FRANCE, ITALY, PAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1960-2010

Legend:
- Irregular
- High-skilled
- Low-skilled
- Asylum seekers
- Refugees
- Students
- Family members

Note:
Positive values on vertical axis = more restrictive
Negative values on vertical axis = less restrictive

Source:
DEMIG POLICY database recoded by the authors

Despite the prevailing view that Europe has progressively transformed in a fortress since the mid-1970s, the previous section showed considerable variations across countries and migrants categories. However, it revealed that the 1990s were a turning point, as measures to restrict or prevent the entry of non-European migrants on their territory as well as measures encouraging or forcing migrants to return have increasingly been implemented by European countries from this period. This coincides with the end of the Cold War, and the “fear of invasion” triggered by the opening of the Iron Curtain (Streiff-Fénart 2012, p.viii), which may have led to the tightening of immigration policies in Europe.

The question at stake is to what extent changes in migration policies have led to changes in migration trends. That immigration in Europe, especially from Africa, did not abate after the end of labour recruitment in 1973-74 is a fact already well established (Lucas 2014). To what extent is that due to one and/or the other of the substitution effects mentioned in the introduction? Evidence provided by the literature remains so far uncertain.

Bilateral databases on migrant stocks (from UN, the World Bank or OECD) tend to support the assumption of a “spatial substitution” effect: over the last decades, African migrants tended to diversify the range of their destinations within and outside Europe (Lucas 2014; Zimmermann 1995). Table 4 illustrates for our countries of interest the growing number of Sub-Saharan migrants in Europe, as well as their deflection from old to new destinations. The extent to which these geographical shifts are due to policy changes, and especially differentials in restrictiveness, remain however unclear.

The “categorical substitution” hypothesis is also supported by numbers showing the rise in the numbers of stay permits delivered for family motives or the growing number of asylum seekers (Lucas 2014). The deflection into irregularity is however less clearly supported by evidence. By nature, irregular migrants form a hard-to-count population. Without citing his source, Lucas (2014) indicates that “on average over half a million people per year were found to be illegally present in the EU from 2008-10” and that “nearly a third was Africans, over half of whom were from SSA”. There is a general belief that most irregular migrants are overstayers who entered legally, a pattern especially common among asylum seekers (Collyer, 2006; Duvell, 2006). A number of qualitative studies also suggest that migrants who intend to enter Europe without a visa tend to use more and more complex and dangerous routes (de Haas 2008; Van Moppes, 2006; Hamood, 2006). However, beyond speculation, there is so far no quantitative evidence on trends regarding the amount and the forms irregular migration over the last decades.

The “reverse-flow” substitution hypothesis has received so far little quantitative support because of the scarcity of data on return migration (Beauchemin 2014). Some scattered studies however suggest that return migration—at least from some European countries to some African countries– has decreased over the last decades. For instance, out-migration statistics published by nationality in Belgium suggest -for Congolese migrants- that the likelihood of return migration has diminished since the 1990s (Schoonvaere, 2010)(Flahaux 2013). Programmes of assisted return are believed to have little impact on the flows, as they actually concern a small number of migrants (Koser and Kuschminder 2015).

Finally, there is so far no evidence on a possible “inter-temporal substitution” effect through which would-be migrants would anticipate their departure in expectation of forthcoming
tightened migration conditions. In the rest of this section, we use the MAFE data to test further each of the above cited substitution effects. We start by presenting the MAFE data.

### TABLE 4. STOCKS OF AFRICAN MIGRANTS IN EUROPE - MAFE COUNTRIES (1960, 1980 AND 2000)

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<td><strong>DR Congo</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>6,532</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>8,815</td>
<td>11,774*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ghana</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>17,479</td>
<td>26,289</td>
<td>28,291</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>14,388</td>
<td>22,996</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Senegal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,183</td>
<td>53,476</td>
<td>3,682**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>3,888</td>
<td>49,590</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,192</td>
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</table>

* The number of Congolese migrants in Belgium in 2000 seems to have been underestimated in the Global Bilateral Migration Database. The Belgian Population Register counts 40,301 individuals born with the Congolese citizenship. Among them, many have acquired the Belgian citizenship and 4,314 are still Congolese (Schoonvaere 2010).

** The number of Senegalese migrants in France in 2000 seems to have been misreported in the Global Bilateral Migration Database. The OECD database (DIOC) counts 54,000 Senegalese migrants in France in 2000. The same year, UN-DESA reports 78,572 Senegalese migrants in France (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013).

### The MAFE Data

Although migration gained a high position in the policy agenda of both European and African countries, the lack of data on African migration was a widely recognized fact in the early 2000s (Lucas, 2006; Hatton, 2004). The MAFE project was built to produce new data on African migration. It consists in a multi-site project, with objectives and questionnaires inspired by the Mexican Migration Project (Beauchemin 2012). The primary objectives of the MAFE project were to measure trends and patterns of migration, to study factors of departures and returns, and to analyse the consequences of international migration on economic and family outcomes. Both household and individual data were collected in 2008-2009 on three migration systems, each including a country of origin in Africa (Ghana, Senegal and DR Congo), the former colonial metropolis (respectively UK, France and Belgium) and one or two new destination countries in Europe (Figure 3). The same questionnaires were used in all settings, making data comparable across countries.

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* The questionnaires are available in English, French, Italian and Spanish at: [http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/](http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/). Data are also available on line.
Household surveys were conducted in sending countries among representative samples of households of selected cities (Accra and Kumasi, Ghana; Dakar in Senegal; Kinshasa in DR Congo). The samples were limited to these cities because of budget and time constraints. Dakar represents around a quarter of the total population of Senegal, Kinshasa around 12% of the population of DR Congo, and Accra and Kumasi about 17% of Ghana’s population (Beauchemin 2015). Outmigration is known to be higher from these cities than from the rest of the country (Beauchemin 2015).

In the household questionnaire, data were collected on all the usual members of the household, as well as on a series of people related to the household but who were not household members at the time of the survey. These additional people include especially all heads’ children who were living out of the household at the time of the survey, whatever their place of residence (including those who are deceased). Questions on migration experience included the following: (1) whether or not each individual cited in the questionnaire had lived for at least one year out of the origin country, (2) the year of the first departure for at least one year to another country, (3) the destination country of the first migration, (4) whether or not the person had returned for at least one year, and if yes (5) the year of the first return. This information was collected to allow for the retrospective computation of trends in rates of departure and return. The methodology used to compute these trends is fully described in Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2015).

Individual data are also used in this paper. They consist in biographic data collected both in Africa and in Europe among people aged 25 and over. Non-migrants and returnees in Africa were randomly selected in the selected households. Migrants were interviewed in Europe. In Spain, the sample was randomly selected in the Padron, a register that includes both irregular and regular migrants. In the other countries, where such a sampling frame was not available,

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8 Two-stage stratified random samples of households were selected in each city. Stratification was used in order to increase the number of migrants in the sample (Schoumaker and Mezger 2013). First, primary sampling units with a high level of out-migration were over-sampled (except in Ghana). Second, within the selected primary sampling units, households with migrants were oversampled. In the listing phase, households with return migrants and households in which at least one adult was living abroad were identified; these households were oversampled by a factor of about 5 in Senegal and Ghana, and 4 in DR Congo. Sampling weights are used in all the analyses to take oversampling into account.
we followed a quota approach based on age, gender and socio-economic status\(^9\), using a combination of different recruitment methods (snowballing at origin\(^{10}\) and destination, recruitment in various public places, random selection in a list of volunteers identified in churches...) to ensure that different types of persons had a non-zero probability of being included in the sample. The sampling and weighting methodology is detailed in Schoumaker et al. (2013). Along with employment and family histories, migration histories were collected with a wealth of details. Legal status trajectories were collected; at any time the data thus indicates whether migrants had the right to stay and/or work. A full module was also dedicated to the collection of information on the routes followed by migrants when they left their origin country: who they travelled with, means of transportation, list of transit countries, etc. The questionnaire also included subjective and open-ended questions on the motives of migration and the reasons for destination choices. In addition, questions were asked on migration intentions, both to register the steps that interviewees (who actually migrated or not) had taken to prepare an international migration and to capture the intended duration of stays abroad among those who actually migrated.

The MAFE data offer rich information on migration patterns. They suffer however from a number of limitations. First, the biographic surveys covered a very limited set of destination countries so that migration systems are not fully covered. In particular, transit countries in Africa (especially in Maghreb) are not included. Second, samples are not fully representative at the national level. Third, sample sizes are limited (Figure 3). Estimates are thus subject to error measurements and cannot be interpreted without taking account of the confidence intervals. Despite these limitations, the MAFE data allow to generate results on phenomena that are overshadowed in conventional data sources. While most existing data are based on immigration in destination countries (with sometimes large errors, as illustrated in Table 4), the MAFE data allows to compute measures of actual and intended out-migration and return. And whereas official data provide little clues on undocumented migration, the MAFE data offers a wealth of information on migrants’ geographical and legal trajectories. In the following sections, we use these data to test the four substitution hypotheses.

**Trends in departures: testing the inter-temporal substitution hypothesis**

While the policy expectation is that more restrictions result in less migration, the inter-temporal substitution hypothesis suggests that policy stiffening can paradoxically contribute to increase flows. The rationale is that would-be migrants anticipate further restrictions and decide to move before migration policies become even more restrictive. As shown before, with very few exceptions, policies in Europe globally followed a continuous trend towards more entry controls (Table 1). This is typically a context that makes credible the idea that migrating today is easier that migrating tomorrow.

The results of the MAFE project partly confirm this now-or-never migration hypothesis. A module of the biographic questionnaire was dedicated to migration “attempts”, as the questionnaire called them. Rather than registering attempts to physically cross border(s), the

\(^9\) Due to the small size of the sample in each country, it was not possible either to apply alternative selection methods designed to reach rare populations in the absence of a sampling frame, such as respondent driven sampling or intercept point surveys (Heckathorn, 1997; Marpsat & Razafindratsima, 2010; McKenzie & Mistiaen, 2009).

\(^{10}\) The efficiency of the method consisting in collecting contacts in origin countries is fully discussed on the basis of the MAFE-Senegal experience in (Beauchemin and Gonzalez-Ferrer 2011).
module registered practical steps that would-be migrants had undertaken with the intention of moving out of DR Congo, Ghana or Senegal. Such steps include saving money, asking for or obtaining the necessary travel documents such as passports, visas, accommodation certificates, registration at a university, etc. as well as transit migration without succeeding in reaching the target country (see more details in Table A-3). In short, the MAFE surveys registered situation beyond mere intentions to move. With these data we can identify candidates for migration, “adding some objectivity to the measure of migration intention” (Mezger Kveder 2012).

Trends in the lifetime probability of taking steps towards migration show a clear surge in the attempts to move to Europe at the turn of the 21st century. Attempts especially peaked in Senegal in the 2000s, with one Senegalese in three trying to fulfil the conditions to leave, while the proportion was about 10% in the previous decades (Figure 4-Europe). This global upward trend in steps towards migration could be partly due to a methodological bias: as the question is retrospective, the proportions may be underestimated in the first periods (compared to the more recent one), especially for attempts that did not get far. However, there is no reason to believe that this potential bias would affect differently the 3 origin countries. In particular, this potential bias is certainly not sufficient to explain the boom in Senegalese attempts to move to Europe in the 2000s. Changing policies are part of the explanation. As shown in the previous section, European countries actually multiplied constraints over time: they created administrative steps prior to migration in order to be able to better select new comers. For instance, until the mid-1980s, asking and obtaining a visa was not required for African migrants intending to move to many countries in Europe. This explains the low probabilities of taking such steps in the first period of observation. The surge in migration attempts to Europe could also partly signal a “now or never” logic whereby, in contexts of growing restrictions, would-be migrants accelerate their migration project to avoid the even stiffer policy measures that might arise in the future. In such contexts, even people with very vague migration projects may be tempted to take steps towards migration. Beyond mere congruence between trends observed in policies and in flows, Mezger (2012) has studied the effect of restrictive policies on the individual probability to take steps to migrate among people living in the region of Dakar, Senegal. Controlling for many determinants, she showed in a longitudinal analysis that more restrictions in policies to combat illegal immigration in France, Italy and Spain tend to augment the probability of taking steps to out-migrate to Europe.

Obviously, steps towards migration are not actual migration. In contexts where policies are designed to control migration, one would expect that attempts to migrate do not transform in actual migration. Figure 5 shows trends in actual departure from our three African countries of interest to Europe. Although trends in intended and actual departures have been computed using different sources, we believe that a comparison between these trends is meaningful11. The trends in steps to move to Europe do not match completely the trends of actual migration (Figure 4 vs. Figure 5). While both trends follow a similar pattern in Ghana, they contrast heavily in DR Congo and Senegal. In the former country, trends are opposed: the growing propensity to undertake steps in the 2000s contrasts with the decrease of actual migration. And in the

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11 Figure 4 (steps to migration) is based on the biographic data collected among all individuals in Dakar. Figure 5 (actual migration) is based on a sub-sample of the household data (children of households heads in Dakar). All individuals included in the biographic survey in African countries were also included in the household surveys. Both statistics refer to the same periods, the same places, the same destinations and the same age groups.
latter, steps boomed while actual migration rather stalled\textsuperscript{12}. These gaps may mirror the rising costs of migration from Africa to Europe. They suggest that European policies may have been successful in restraining out-migration (except in Ghana), even though they also increased the wishes to migrate.

The trends in intended and actual migration to non-European destinations offer an interesting background to better understand migration to Europe. First, the Congolese case exemplifies the fact that a profound crisis in Africa does not necessarily end-up with a rush to Europe. The civil war that occurred in DR Congo in the 1990s fuelled much more moderately out-migration to Europe than to Africa and, after 2000 and the restoration of a more peaceful context, the propensity to out-migrate to Europe reduced drastically, while it continued to progress sharply to African destinations. Second, except in the case of DR Congo, growing restrictions in Europe did not end up with increasing migration within Africa. Congolese migration to its neighbouring countries boomed as a result of opening opportunities, with the end of Apartheid (Steinberg, 2005; Sumata 2002a) and the end of the Angola war in the early 2000s and the unprecedented economic development. On the contrary, opportunities in Africa for Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants have reduced sensibly since the 1970s. Nigeria used to be a major destination for Ghanaians (Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1992) thanks to its oil boom; but the deterioration of the economic context led to massive expulsions of immigrants from Nigeria (in 1983 and 1985). Senegalese were also many to migrate to flourishing economies in Francophone Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, notably Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon; but these countries were also hit by economic crises and developed anti-immigrant policies in the 1990s (Bredeloup 2007). In this context, Europe remained a destination of first choice despite its growing closure. Third, results also show a deflection of African migrants to new destinations. Steps to move to non-European and non-African countries rose equally in our three African countries at the turn of the XXI\textsuperscript{th} Century (Figure 4-Other Destinations). The USA and Canada are actually the main intended destination, as a result of the introduction of the diversity programme (1990), also known as the Green card lottery, that is believed to be a major driver of the new African immigration in the USA (Thomas 2011). Actual migration to this new destination is much stronger among Ghanaians than among Senegalese or Congolese, probably because of language reasons (Figure 5-Other Destinations).

In the end, the MAFE data provide mixed evidence regarding the inter-temporal substitution hypothesis. On the one hand, across the three African countries of interest in this study, trends in steps towards migration tend to support the idea of a now-or-never effect with a growing proportion of people intending concretely to move to Europe in times of growing restrictions. On the other hand, trends in actual migration are more heterogeneous. While out-migration to Europe progressed in Ghana, it decreased from DR Congo (although the result is barely significant) and stalled in Senegal. The gaps in intended and actual migration in the two latter countries suggest that European states have succeeded in curbing some out-migration. However, in a context of demographic growth, constant rates of departure mean a progress in the number of out-migrants. All in all, if the inter-temporal substitution hypothesis is not fully confirmed, it is nevertheless clear that migration from Africa to Europe did not decrease in times of restriction.

\textsuperscript{12} Other nationally representative sources in Senegal indicate that the propensity to out-migrate remained stable between 1992 and 2002, with approximately 7 Senegalese living abroad since less than 5 years per 1,000 habitants within the country (Lessault and Flahaux, 2014).
FIGURE 4: LIFETIME PROBABILITY OF TAKING STEPS TOWARDS MIGRATION BY DESTINATION (1975-2007)

FIGURE 5: LIFETIME PROBABILITY OF DEPARTURE BY DESTINATION FROM AFRICA (1975-2008).
New vs. old destinations: testing the spatial substitution hypothesis

The destination diversification of African migrants in Europe is a well-established fact exemplified by stock figures given in Table 4. While it is generally assumed that this shift to new receiving countries results from national differentials in migration policies, this relationship is not clearly established. The contrasting policy trends between France on one hand and Italy and Spain on the other hand appear as an intuitive explanation for the development of Senegalese migration to the Mediterranean countries (Table 1 and Table 2). But the much more tightening stance of UK compared to Belgium does not conform the view that Congolese migrants partly reoriented themselves from Belgium to the UK because of a greater policy openness to immigration in the British islands.

The MAFE biographic survey explicitly questioned the migrants on the reasons that guided the choice of their destination. Questions were open-ended and answers recoded afterwards. A series of answers were recoded under the “facility and papers” label. Whatever the origin of the migrants, the proportion declaring such a motive of destination choice is around 10% (Figure 6). And results show no significant differences between old and new destinations or according to the degree of immigration openness (Figure 6). In other words, according to migrants’ declarations, entry regulations would not make a difference. “Family” is a more
frequent answer to justify destination choices. In a way, it is related to “papers” since family reunification is a guaranteed right in all European countries, even though with more or less restrictions. But again, results show no significant results that would explain the shift to new countries (Figure 6). The most discriminating motive to explain destination choices relates to labour: migrants in new destinations, especially Spain and Italy, are proportionally much more numerous to declare they choose their country of residence for work. Migrants’ answers actually echo the fact that, Spain and Italy were characterized at the turn of the 21th Century by a high demand of low-skilled labour in agriculture, industry (especially in northern Italy) and in services (tourism and care).

On the other hand, old destination countries keep their attractive power for cultural reasons, especially language proximity (Figure 6). This is also related to education. Former colonial countries are preferred over other destination for studies. Beyond language, institutional factors are of tremendous importance because education systems in former colonies are structured on the model of the former metropolis which eases diploma recognition both at origin and destination. For instance, in Senegal, formal education is given in French and the education system has the same structure of the French one. As a result, it is easier for Senegalese students to have their diplomas recognized in France than in other countries. Conversely, diplomas obtained in France are better recognized back in Senegal than those from Spain or Italy. The same analysis applies for the comparison of Congolese in Belgium vs. UK or Ghanaians in UK vs. the Netherlands: the former colonial metropolis always remains the first choice for students.

Overall, results suggest that migration policies regarding entry are less decisive in destination choices than labour demand or social connections (family or friends). That states openness regarding immigrants’ entry is not a strong determinant is also confirmed when looking at the routes followed by migrants. One could expect more open countries to register more “direct” migrants, i.e. migrants entering the country without transiting by other European countries. This hypothesis fits a concern often expressed by restrictive countries in Europe: they fear that open countries are mere gates of entry in Europe, with migrants entering there before moving to other destinations, thanks to EU free circulation agreements. Actually, the MAFE results do not conform to this view (Table 5). The proportion of migrants who enter directly Europe without transiting by any other country is clearly higher in old destinations (e.g. 70% in Belgium vs. 55% in UK for Congolese migrants). It could be argued that this result reflects the fact that migrants in new and open destinations, especially Spain and Italy, more frequently entered as undocumented migrants and for that reason took complex routes through transit countries in Africa (see next section). However, although it is often believed that transit countries are only located in African countries (Castagnone 2010), results show that migrants in new European destinations had less direct routes because they transited by other European countries, especially traditional destinations. It appears, for instance, that transiting in France to go to Italy is much more frequent (second route of Senegalese migrants in Italy) than the reverse route (Italy does not even appear among the top five routes to France, Table 5). France and Belgium are also two common transit countries among Congolese in the UK, illustrating the “Euro-Congolese” wave of migrants (Pachi, Barrett and Garbin, 2010). Social networks are undoubtedly the main explanation: migrants enter in countries where they have social

13 These fears were for instance clearly expressed during the preparation of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008).
connections before moving to places that offer better work prospects (as above indicated by the “work” answers).

Finally, our results do not completely confirm the spatial substitution hypothesis. They do not contradict the fact that migrants are deflected towards new destinations. But, according to migrants, this reorientation is less commanded by policy changes than by work opportunities. However both aspects are related: countries in need of labour, such as Italy or Spain, are also the more open to immigration in general and the more compliant regarding irregular migration (see section 1).

FIGURE 6. MOTIVES OF CHOICE OF DESTINATION IN EUROPE (1975-2007), BY ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FIGURE 6. MOTIVES OF CHOICE OF DESTINATION IN EUROPE (1975-2007),
BY ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE

LANGUAGE

STUDIES

FRIENDS

QUALITIES OF THE COUNTRY
FIGURE 6. MOTIVES OF CHOICE OF DESTINATION IN EUROPE (1975-2007),
BY ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE

OTHERS


Population: migrants living in Europe at the time of the survey.

Measure: Percentage of migrants declaring each type of motive for the choice of their first destination in Europe (first stay of at least one year after age 18). The exact question was: "And for what reasons did you choose to go to "country of stay" rather than to another country? (Note precisely and verbatim the entire response)". Answers were coded; a unique answer may have received several codes. All motives cited by respondents are shown in the figure.

TABLE 5: TOP-3 ROUTES TO EUROPE OF AFRICAN MIGRANTS (1975-2008),
BY ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>1st route</th>
<th>2nd route</th>
<th>3rd route</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>DRC-Belgium (70%)</td>
<td>DRC-Angola-Belgium (4%)</td>
<td>DRC-France-Belgium (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>DRC-UK (55%)</td>
<td>DRC-Belgium-UK (8%)</td>
<td>DRC-France-UK (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Ghana-UK (76%)</td>
<td>Ghana-Nigeria-UK (4%)</td>
<td>Ghana-Germany-UK (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Ghana-Netherlands (65%)</td>
<td>Ghana-Germany-Netherlands (8%)</td>
<td>Ghana-Italy-Netherlands (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Senegal-France (79%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Spain-France (4%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Morocco-France (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Senegal-Italy (69%)</td>
<td>Senegal-France-Italy (15%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Spain-Italy (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Senegal-Spain (64%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Morocco-Spain (9%)</td>
<td>Senegal-Italy-Spain (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAFE biographic surveys in Europe. Weighted percentages

Growing irregularity: testing the categorical substitution hypothesis

Even though the period under study in this paper can globally be labelled as a “period of restrictions”, legal migration to Europe was still possible at that time: family reunification and asylum seeking became two major channels of entry into Europe after old destinations put an official end to labour migration. The MAFE data are not the more appropriate to show these categorical shifts from a legal channel of entry (work) to others (family, asylum); official data on titles granted to immigrants are more suited for this purpose. However official data are, by definition, of little use to test the hypothesis that more restrictions created deflection into irregularity in Europe, as observed in the USA. In this section, taking advantage of the MAFE data, we measure to what extent irregular migration from Sub-Saharan Africa developed over the last decades.
A typical image of African irregular migrants, largely conveyed by media, is the one of people crossing the sea from Africa and reaching Spain or Italy. However, previous literature has already emphasized that most migrants, including African ones, entered Europe legally (Triandafyllidou 2010; de Haas 2008). In this section, we define irregular migrants as migrants who mentioned they did not have a residence permit at some point in time during their first year in their destination country. As shown by Vickstrom (2014), there are “multiple paths into irregularity”: migrants may enter with a visa and remain in Europe after it has expired, thus becoming “overstayers”; others may experience “befallen irregularity” when their residence permit is not renewed. Overstaying is quite a common path to irregularity. Vickstrom’s multivariate analysis of the factors associated with the different pathways into irregularity has even shown that entering Italy or Spain with a visa is actually a strong predictor of irregularity. In the following analyses, we distinguish irregular status and illegal entry.

Figure 7 provides clear evidence of growing irregular migration in Europe from Sub-Saharan Africa. The trend is much steeper for Congolese and Senegalese than for Ghanaians, so that levels or irregular stay the year of arrival differ significantly across origins in the last period (30-35% of irregular migrants for the former against less than 10% for the latter in the 2000s). The growing irregularity of migrants actually reflects the fact that irregular migration is much more frequent in new destinations (Figure 7). This distinction also applies to illegal entry: migrants who travelled at some point with a smuggler are significantly more numerous among Congolese in UK, Ghanaians in the Netherlands and Senegalese in Spain and Italy (Figure 9). Several reasons can be mentioned to explain this distinction between old and new destinations.

A first explanation relates to social networks. Migrants have potentially more connections of relatives and friends in traditional destination countries than in new destinations, where communities are smaller and less established. The weakness of social networks, and especially of family ties at destination, is an important predictor of an irregular status, as it has been demonstrated in the case of Senegalese migration to Europe (Vickstrom 2014).

The second explanation refers to the changing policy context. As already mentioned, irregular migration was less likely to happen before the mid-1980s because receiving countries were not as interested as today in controlling entries and stays: in the absence of visa requirements, the notion of irregular entry was simply irrelevant. This explains partly why irregular migration is lower in older destinations. The UK offers an interesting example where the level of irregularity varies greatly according to migrants origin and migration history (Figure 7), with about 40% of irregularity the first year of stay among Congolese (a group of new comers), against less than 10% among Ghanaians (a well-established group of migrants in the UK).

Another policy related explanation could be that old destinations are also those who became less tolerant to irregular migration. Let us have a new look on policy trends to compare systematically old and new destinations and see whether the former ones adopted more severe stances than the latter ones (Table 1 to Table 3). This hypothesis tends to be confirmed in our three case studies. First, that Senegalese migrants have less often an irregular status in France than in its Mediterranean neighbours corresponds to the fact that Spain and Italy have clearly less restrictive policies in all areas of migration policy (entry, integration and return). In this case, irregularity is also linked to the structure of the national economy in Spain and Italy: since residence permits can only be obtained by migrants who can produce a work contract, the high level of informality in the job market is part of the explanation (Vickstrom 2014). Second case: the deflection of Congolese from Belgium to the UK could indeed reflect the early and very continuous stiffening of integration and return policies (rather than entry policies) regarding irregular
migrants in Belgium. When compared to Belgian policies, UK policies have indeed followed a later and gentler turn towards more restrictiveness. However, when compared to the Netherlands, UK appears as more restrictive, especially in terms of entry and integration regulations. This could explain our third case, i.e. the deflection of Ghanaian migrants from UK to the Netherlands.

A third possible explanation is of geographical nature. In Mediterranean countries, the proximity with Africa could contribute to explain high rates of irregularity (about 40%-50% during the first year of stay in Spain and Italy among Senegalese migrants, Figure 7). Spain and Italy are obviously in positions to be gates of entry for irregular African migrants. This is exemplified by the percentages of sea-crossers among Senegalese migrants to Italy or Spain: in the 2000s, a peak period, about one Senegalese out three who entered Spain using a boat (Figure 8). But migrants adapt their routes to border enforcement measures (Streiff-Fénart and Segatti, 2012) and catastrophes at sea in 2015 illustrate that the geography of sea-crossing has shifted towards other places.

Overall, our results show that irregular migration is very context specific: it varies both by origin and destination. The UK case illustrates the fact that a same policy context can lead to very different levels of irregularity, with new origin groups being at higher risk of irregularity. A very same context can both lead to divert old migrant groups towards new destinations that are less restrictive (such as the Ghanaians to the Netherlands) and attract new groups who are deflected from their traditional destinations when these one tighten their policies (such as Belgium). Overall, the results tend to confirm the categorical substitution hypothesis: all indicators show that irregular migration has progressed in times of growing restrictions. However, we have also showed that this substitution effect interacts with the spatial substitution effect, as irregular migration prevalence is higher in new destination countries. Irregular migration is not a mere substitute to regular migration in countries that tighten their migration policies, it is rather an aspect of the transformation of the migration systems.
FIGURE 7. PERCENTAGE OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS DURING THE FIRST YEAR IN EUROPE (1975-2008), BY ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (AT THE TIME OF THE SURVEY) AND PERIOD OF ARRIVAL.

Source: MAFE Biographic Surveys in Europe.
Measure: Percentage of migrants who declared that, during the first year in the country of residence, they did not have a residence permit at some point. This is not synonymous for illegal entry: a person may have entered legally, with a visa that expired.
Weighted results, 90% confidence intervals.

FIGURE 8: PERCENTAGE OF AFRICAN MIGRANTS WHO TRAVELLED BY SEA (1975-2008), BY ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (AT THE TIME OF THE SURVEY) AND PERIOD OF ARRIVAL.

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Europe.
Measure: Percentage of migrants who travelled by sea at some stage in their journey to Europe.
Weighted results, 90% confidence intervals.
FIGURE 9: PERCENTAGE OF AFRICAN MIGRANTS WHO TRAVELLED WITH A SMUGGLER (1975-2008), BY ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (AT THE TIME OF THE SURVEY) AND PERIOD OF ARRIVAL.

Trends of return: testing the reverse flow substitution hypothesis

In addition to accelerating departures (inter-temporal substitution effect), shifting routes and destinations (spatial substitution effect), and encouraging irregular migration (categorical substitution effect), restrictive policies in receiving countries are also believed to encourage settlement at destination by discouraging spontaneous return of migrants. This process, coined by de Haas (2011) as a “reverse flow substitution effect” rests on two rationales. First, migrants are all the more adverse to return that the possibilities to re-migrate are restricted. The underlying assumption is that return projects are linked to the perspectives of reinsertion in the home society, which entails some risks since returnees may experience re-adaptation difficulties. The possibility to re-migrate would be as a sort of insurance against failure upon return. Restrictive immigration policies, that impede this possibility, tend thus to discourage return. The other rationale is that restrictive policies tend to augment migrants vulnerability (e.g., they make them more likely to be undocumented), which delays the migrants’ target achievement, and thus reduces their odds of return. The reverse flow substitution hypothesis is comforted by analyses on Mexican migration to the USA that has progressively transformed from a circulation to a settlement system (Massey et al. 2002; Massey and Pren 2012). In Africa, and especially in Senegal, a rich socio-anthropological literature tends to confirm the hypothesis. Return is historically described as an intrinsic part of the departure project (Castagnone 2010), but studies published in the 2000’s suggest that returns are postponed because conditions in host countries make it increasingly difficult to fulfil hopes for economic success, to honour family obligations and insure a socially successful return (Sinatti 2009). The lack of demographic data on return migration has so far hampered any generalisation of these qualitative observations. The MAFE data allows us to some extent to test the reverse flow substitution hypothesis in the context of African migration.
We used the household MAFE data on heads’ children to compute trends of return to origin countries (Figure 10). Due to limited sample sizes, confidence intervals are very large and results are poorly significant. Some results are however remarkable. A first important result is that returns from African countries are in most cases significantly more frequent than from Europe. There are many reasons to explain this apparent retention power of Europe. It could be basically related to the wide difference between economic conditions in Africa and Europe: earnings, living conditions, social benefits, etc. could explain why migrants tend to remain in Europe. This explanation fits the neo-classical theory of migration determinants quite well. It could be also that there is a process of initial selection into migration, with migrants intending to return being more likely to move to neighbouring destinations, while those who aim to move for good would prefer Europe. Finally, the African-European gap in return could be a confirmation of the reverse flow substitution hypothesis. While Europe has increasingly implemented restrictive immigration policies, migration within Africa is subject to much less control (see Figure 2 for a comparison on visa requirements). This observation applies especially to Senegal and Ghana, which are both involved in the free movement protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, founded in 1975).

Beyond destinations comparison, does the evolution of return probabilities since the 1975 confirm the “reverse-flow substitution” hypothesis? Would the hypothesis be valid, we should observe a decrease in the propensity to return from Europe over time as entry, integration and return policies tended to tightened. Even though the breadth of confidence intervals on Figure 10 makes difficult to discern clear trends, three results appear: (1) return from Europe to DR Congo decreased drastically after 1990, (2) return to Ghana peaked in the 2000s, and (3) return to Senegal did not significantly evolved over time. Taken together these results do not provide clear evidence in favour of less return as migration policies tended to become more restrictive.

Context at origin explains at partly these contrasting results. The democratization of Ghana in the early 1990s, the improved political stability, and Ghana’s economic recovery have probably played a role in attracting return migrants from Europe in the years 2000 (Black and Castaldo 2009). As a matter of fact, returnees in Ghana reintegrated well in the labor market (Castagnone et al. 2013). Decrease in return to DR Congo relates to the effects of the civil war. On one hand, the economic crisis and political troubles made the country obviously less attractive for potential returnees. On the other hand, the civil war also drastically changed the migrants’ profile: before, most of them were members of the country’s elite and went to Europe to study or do professional/training missions in big firms or the administration with the intention to return to DR Congo after completing their task (Kagné and Martiniello 2001). When the country entered its turmoil period, Congolese migration became less selective: migrants came from less favored socioeconomic categories (Sumata 2002b; Schoumaker et al. 2010), the proportion of women also progressed in migration to Europe, partly in relation to family reunification (Vause 2012), and—in the end— Congolese migrants who used to be circular migrants started to be settlers.

To complement results in trends of actual return, we also used the MAFE biographic data to compute trends of intention to return. Migrants (whether living in Europe or back in Africa)

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14 Note that other estimates where computed using an alternative method in previous publications (Flahaux, Beauchemin, and Schoumaker 2013). Although differences between return from Africa and Europe were also marked in these previous computations, the results presented here tend to show lower levels of return.

15 For a discussion on the potential effects of distance on migration determinants, see Gonzalez-Ferrer et al. (2014).
were asked how long they intended to stay at destination at the time of their arrival in each of their receiving countries. The question was both retrospective and subjective and thus potentially subject to ex-post revision. It gives however a complementary view on return migration (within 10 years) with lesser error measurement thanks to larger samples (Figure 11). Results remind us that a significant proportion of migrants (never less than 20%) consider themselves as temporary migrants. This varies by origin and period. The decreasing trend of return between 1975 and 2008 among Congolese migrants (Figure 10) is confirmed, though with a regain of return intentions in the 1990s that may be explained by the fact that most migrants at that time were refugees (Figure 11). The U-shape of actual return to Ghana (Figure 10) is confirmed in intended returns (Figure 11). Finally, intentions to return followed a downward trend among Senegalese migrants. Overall, a pattern common to the three origin groups appears: intentions to return declined over time. In all cases, rates in the 2000s are lower than before 1990. A quantitative multivariate analysis further showed that intentions to return became less and less predictive of actual return over time among Senegalese and Congolese migrants (Ghana was excluded from the study). In other terms, as immigration policies became more restrictive, migrants in Europe revised their initial intention to return, postponing if not cancelling it (Flahaux 2015). These results tend to support the reverse flow substitution hypothesis.

It might be argued that intentions at arrival in Europe do not take into account unwanted returns, especially among migrants who were invited, if not forced, to go back home by public authorities because of their lack of legal legitimacy (undocumented migrants, including rejected asylum seekers). The argument is all the more important that all European countries developed return policies, from pay-to-go programs to deportation (Table 3). However, MAFE results show that moving back to Africa is essentially a “spontaneous” phenomenon. Asked who decided for their return from Europe, “only” 8% of Ghanaian returnees, 9% of Senegalese returnees and 15% of Congolese returnees responded that public authorities at destination were involved. These numbers echo the answers given by returnees about their motives of migration. 13% of the Ghanaians, 15% of the Senegalese and 4% of the Congolese reported “administrative reasons” that actually refer to legal status issues (Table 6). Not all of these were expulsions or “assisted voluntary returns”: respondents’ detailed answers show that some undocumented migrants decided to return home on their own initiative (Flahaux et al. 2014). For the most, motives indicate that return is much more a personal decision than the product of an institutional constraint: family, work, studies are the main reasons why people go back to their origin country in Africa (Table 6). Finally, longitudinal and multivariate analyses on the determinants of return migration from Europe to Sub-Saharan Africa have shown that undocumented migrants are not more likely to return: legal status makes no difference among Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants and irregular migrants are less likely to return among Congolese (Flahaux, Beauchemin, and Schoumaker 2014; González-Ferrer et al. 2014).

Although voluntary return is not a prerequisite for permanent return, there is some evidence from the MAFE data suggesting that forced returns are followed by new departures to Europe. On the one hand, in an event-history analysis of repeated migration (i.e. a second migration to Europe after a return in Senegal), Flahaux (2013) showed that unintended returned migrants (i.e. who had no intention of returning when they arrived in Europe) are significantly more likely to move back to Europe than those who originally had a return project. On the other hand, in his study of pathways into irregular status among Senegalese migrants in Europe, Vickstrom (2014) showed the cumulative nature of entering Europe with no visa: migrants who had a prior
experience of illegal entry (and so were at risk of being deported) are more likely to follow this irregular path of entry than those who had no migration experience at all. All in all, studies of Senegalese migration confirm that “managed” returns certainly have little effect on net migration in Europe.

Overall, taking account of both “managed” and “spontaneous” movements, our results rather support the reverse flow substitution hypothesis. No conclusion can be drawn from the trends over time in actual return from Europe: results are hampered by too small samples. However, the double fact that (1) actual return is less common from Europe than from Africa and (2) intentions to return from Europe declined over time tend to confirm the assumption that more restrictive contexts tend to decrease journeys to home. Contrary to policy expectation, our results thus suggest that tightened migration regulations do not encourage return migration. Policies explicitly aimed at encouraging or forcing return seem to have very limited results: most returns are actually spontaneous, irregular migrants are not more likely to return (and even less likely in the case of DR Congo), and returnees forced to go back are more likely to remigrate than spontaneous returnees.

FIGURE 10. PROBABILITY OF RETURNING WITHIN 10 YEARS OF FIRST DEPARTURE, (1975-2008), BY ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (AT THE TIME OF THE SURVEY) AND PERIOD OF ARRIVAL.

Population: All heads children (between age 18 and 40), whatever the age of departure, including deceased children. Stay abroad and return for a period of at least 1 year.
Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals).
FIGURE 11. INTENTION TO STAY LESS THAN 10 YEARS ON FIRST ARRIVAL (1975-2008) 
BY ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (AT THE TIME OF THE SURVEY) AND PERIOD OF ARRIVAL.

Source: MAFE - Senegal, Biographic survey in Europe and Africa, 2008-2009
Population: Sample includes first long stay in a destination country of all migrants still living in a MAFE country or back in the origin country. All migrants left their origin country at age 18 or over in 1975 or later.
Measure: Percent of migrants intending to stay less than 10 years on first arrival in the MAFE countries.
Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals).

TABLE 6. MOTIVES OF RETURN FROM EUROPE BY ORIGIN (1975-2008) – PERCENTAGE OF RETURN MIGRANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>DR Congo</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reasons</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work reasons</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies reasons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties at destination*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative reasons</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-response</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys (2008-2009)
Weighted results.
Sample: Migrants interviewed in Europe and Africa who had stayed for at least one year in Europe and had returned to Ghana, Senegal or Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo).
Interpretation: 18% of returns to Senegal and 23% of returns to DR Congo are due to completion of education in Europe.
* Answers include: Financial problems / low earnings; racism / xenophobia; fed up / deceived with life abroad; hard living conditions...
4. Conclusions

The objective of this paper was to review new evidence on patterns of migration between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe in times of restrictions. Even though the notion that EU members apply uniformly restrictive policies can be contested, our analysis of migration policy changes suggests that the label “times of restriction” for the post-1975 period is accurate. Against this context, we used a unique dataset to compute trends of migration in various areas that are usually overlooked due to the lack of quantitative data: propensity to out-migrate, legal status at entry, routes of migration and propensity to return. Doing so, we were able to test the hypothesis of “substitution effects” proposed by de Haas (2011), according to which migrants’ agency explains at least partly the failure of policies aimed at curbing immigration. The assumption is that migrants adapt their behaviour to new governmental rules to pursue their own migration objective. de Haas distinguished four types of adaptation leading to four corresponding “substitution effects”.

We did not find clear evidence in support of “the inter-temporal substitution effect” or “now or never migration” that occurs when “migration surges in the expectation of a future tightening of migration regulations” (de Haas, 2011, p.27). As migration policies in Europe became more restrictive, we observed an increase in the steps taken to migrate, especially in Senegal. But trends in actual migration do not reflect this growing aspiration to out-migrate to Europe. Migration policies seem to have contradictory effects by both stimulating concrete intentions of migration and still succeeding in curbing some of these attempts. In any case, the combination of these two effects may explain that the rates of out-migration remained roughly constant over time. In other words, it might be that restrictions only serve to contain the growing aspirations they arouse. However, in times of demographic growth, constant rates mean higher number of migrants, while policies aimed at reducing the volume of migration.

Another explanation for the fact that levels in out-migration to Europe remained constant refers to the “categorical substitution” hypothesis that posits that migrants shift their channels of entry to adapt to new regulations. As it was already well documented in the literature, we did not come back in our results on the deflection from labour migration to family reunification or asylum. We rather focused on the shift to irregular migration. Our results confirm that a process of “irregularization” accompanied the trend towards more tighten migration policies in Europe. The proportion of irregular migrants (as measured during the first year of stay in Europe) grew over time, to reach significant levels as high as around 30% of all of Senegalese and Congolese migrants in the 2000s. But irregular migrant is not synonymous of illegal migrant: most migrants entered in Europe legally, with visas or as asylum seekers: only a minority used services of smugglers in the 2000s, although the proportion significantly progressed since 1975.

In complement, we found some support to the hypothesis of “spatial substitution effects”, that occur when migrants switch destination countries to target those which apply less restrictive measures. We wanted to explore to what extent the reorientation of migrants from old to new destinations is due to intra-European differentials in policy changes. Facility to obtain papers did not appear as a discriminant factor in the reasons of destination choices reported by the Senegalese migrants who choose Spain or Italy over France, the Congolese who choose the UK over Belgium or the Ghanaians who choose the Netherlands over UK. According to the migrants themselves, the main motivation for choosing new destinations relates to work opportunities, especially among Senegalese in Spain and Italy. It remains that irregular migrants are
proportionally more numerous in new destinations that seem to be more tolerant towards irregular migrants when compared to the old destinations. These results suggest that migrants’ destination choices and states’ tolerance toward irregular migration are driven by a common factor: a favourable economic context. In any case, it is worth to underline that new destination countries are not mere gates through which migrants would enter to spread in the rest of Europe.

Finally, our results rather confirmed the “reverse flow substitution effect” whereby restrictions aimed at discouraging entry and stay at destination actually discourage return migration. On the one hand, the difference in return rates from Africa vs. Europe suggests that contexts of easy (if not free) circulation (as in Africa) are more favourable to return than contexts of tight border control (as in Europe). On the other hand, the shrinking intentions of migrants to return back to Africa are congruent with the tightening of immigration policies in Europe. However, this trend is not confirmed by trends in actual return. This gap between intended and actual return could indicate that European states are successful in their return policies consisting in deporting irregular migrants or encouraging their return with pay-to-go measures. However, neither the existing literature (for a recent review, see Koser et al. 2015), nor our results support this hypothesis. First, our trends in actual return are barely significant. Second, several other results from the MAFE data show that returns are essentially spontaneous, i.e. decided by the migrants and their families rather than by public authorities.

In many ways, our results on African migration echo those produced on migration between Mexico and the US (Massey and Pren 2012). In both contexts, tightening policies have common effects on migration trends: they did not result in less out-migration, but rather end up with more irregular migration and less return. It does not mean that migration policies completely fail. It rather suggests that other and maybe stronger determinants are at play, such as social networks, work opportunities in destination areas or economic and political context at origin. Looking at three different migration systems, our analyses have shown the heterogeneity of African migration and the importance of the context at origin to explain trends of departure and return. For instance, differences in return trends among Ghanaian and Congolese migrants are certainly attributable to differences in the local prospects of reintegration at origin.

Finally, our analysis of the parallel histories of European migration policies and of African migration calls for further research in at least three directions. First, our analyses on trends in both departure and return show that intended and actual migration do not respond in the same way to policy changes. Future research should explore further how migration policy changes affect differently intentions and actual behaviours. Second, our results suggest that substitution effects are not independent from each other. More specifically, the “spatial substitution” effect (i.e. deflection from a destination to another / others) seems to be associated to other substitution effects, e.g. the “categorical substitution” effect (i.e. the switch from regular to irregular migration), as irregular migration essentially developed in new destinations. This result calls for further analysis on migration systems and on how they transform in relation to relative policy changes. Third, our analyses offered a rough parallelism between policy changes and migration trends. Observation of congruence does not worth causal analysis. Many factors, at origin and destination, have certainly influenced migration trends. Other authors have already assessed with multivariate analyses on OECD countries the net effects of economic and policy factors using macro-data on flows (Ortega and Peri 2009; Mayda 2009). Beyond aggregated analysis, future research could explore how policy changes affect individual behaviours.
### TABLE A- 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT DATABASES AIMING AT ASSESSING THE RESTRICTIVENESS OF MIGRATION POLICIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / Space coverage</th>
<th>Time coverage</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Method / Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a. Mayda and Patel’s index</td>
<td>14 OECD destination countries</td>
<td>1980-2000</td>
<td>Labour migration, asylum, family reunification, border control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. Ortega and Peri’s index (continuation of Mayda and Patel’s index)</td>
<td>+ 1 destination country</td>
<td>Up to 2006</td>
<td>Evolution measured in terms of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ImPol-MAFE-Senegal</td>
<td>France, Italy and Spain (regarding Senegalese migration in particular)</td>
<td>1960-2008</td>
<td>Short stay entry, illegal entry/residence, family reunification, labour migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hatton’s index</td>
<td>14 EU destination countries</td>
<td>1981-1999</td>
<td>Asylum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ruhs’ index</td>
<td>46 high and middle income destination countries, 2009</td>
<td>Labour migration</td>
<td>No evolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. IMPALA</td>
<td>25 destination countries</td>
<td>1960-2010</td>
<td>Acquisition of citizenship, economic migration, family reunification, permanent immigration, temporary migration, asylum and refugee protection, undocumented migration and border control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. IMPIC</td>
<td>33 OECD destination countries</td>
<td>1980-2010</td>
<td>Labour migration, family reunification, asylum, co-ethnicity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. DEMIG POLICY</td>
<td>45 origin and destination countries</td>
<td>1946-2013</td>
<td>Border control, entry, integration and exit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
1a. and 1b.: de Haas et al. 2014
2.: Mezger Kveder 2012; Mezger and Gonzalez-Ferrer (2013)
3.: de Haas et al. 2014
4.: de Haas et al. 2014
5.: http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/impala/home (accessed on 9 April 2015)
6.: Helbling et al. 2013.
### TABLE A-2. CODIFICATION EXAMPLES OF POLICIES REGULATING THE ENTRY, INTEGRATION AND RETURN OF MIGRANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry</th>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Return</th>
<th>Expulsion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travel visa.</td>
<td>Ex: Introduction of travel visa = +1 for all migrants</td>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>Ex: Detention in prison introduced for irregular migrants = +1 for irregular migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier liabilities</td>
<td>Ex: Increased penalties for carriers of undocumented migrants = +1 for irregular migrants</td>
<td>Surveillance technology</td>
<td>Ex: Series of laws that reduce rights of foreigners and introduce more control and sanctions = +1 for all migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance technologies</td>
<td>Ex: Creation of border surveillance system = +1 for irregular migrants</td>
<td>Employer liabilities</td>
<td>Ex: more control of employers and sanctions for irregular work = +1 for irregular migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work permit</td>
<td>Ex: Reduction of catalogue of occupations in short supply and of recruitment at source = +1 for high-skilled and low-skilled workers</td>
<td>Stay permit</td>
<td>Ex: simplification of asylum procedures = -1 for asylum seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota/target</td>
<td>Ex: Introduction of quota for non-EU workers in firms = +1 for low-skilled workers</td>
<td>Work permit</td>
<td>Ex: Procedure to give family members access to work = -1 for family members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry visa</td>
<td>Ex: New requirements for students to be sponsored = +1 for students</td>
<td>Regularisation</td>
<td>Ex: Regularisation programme = -1 for irregular migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Points-based system</td>
<td>Ex: Creation of points-based system for highly educated migrants = -1 for high-skilled workers</td>
<td>Access to permanent residency</td>
<td>Ex: grounds for withdrawing residency permit limited = -1 for all migrants (excepted irregular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Language, housing and cultural integration programmes</td>
<td>Ex: widening of housing and funding for foreign workers beyond Algerians in France = -1 for all (excepted irregular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Access to citizenship</td>
<td>Ex: new requirements for naturalisation = +1 for all migrants (excepted irregular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Access to social benefit and socio-economic rights</td>
<td>Ex: Access to social system granted to legal and irregular migrants = +1 for all migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Access to justice and political rights</td>
<td>Ex: Right to appeal in court = -1 for all migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional capacities</td>
<td>Ex: Creation of deportation centers = +1 for irregular migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+1: increasing right restrictions, -1: decreasing right restrictions

Table adapted from (Flahaux 2014)
### TABLE A-3. STEPS TAKEN FOR EMIGRATION BY WOULD-BE MIGRANTS IN DAKAR, BY DESTINATION (1975-2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step Description</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documents (asked for and/or obtained)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green card lottery</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University registration / scholarship (asked and/or obtained)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee of care and provision (asked and/or obtained)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saved money</td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAFE-Senegal, biographic survey in Senegal

Population: Sample includes people currently living in Senegal (regardless of their migration status), who were born in Senegal (attempts from 1975 onward).

Note: Weighted percentages, Unweighted numbers. Percentages computed for numbers lower than 30 are in brackets. The sum of percentages may be greater or less than 100%. Several steps can be mentioned or no steps may be mentioned in some cases.

Statistical significance: Differences in percentages across regions were tested for each category (F-test). University registration (p<0.10), guarantee (p>0.10), documents (p<0.10), saved money (p>0.10), Green card (p<0.01), Other (p>0.10).
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